The security dilemma
Why one state's defence can become another's threat.
Conceptual diagram, not data.
The security dilemma describes a situation in which the measures one state takes to increase its own security reduce the security of others. Because intentions are hard to read, a neighbour's new defences may look like preparations for attack. The neighbour responds in kind, and both can end up less secure than before, even if neither wanted conflict.
Key thinkers. John Herz named the concept in 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma' (World Politics, 1950). Robert Jervis's 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma' (World Politics, 1978) made it a working analytical tool. Jervis argued that the severity of the dilemma depends on two variables: whether offensive or defensive postures hold the advantage, and whether offensive and defensive capabilities can be told apart. Where defence has the advantage and the two are distinguishable, cooperation becomes considerably easier. Where offence dominates and capabilities look alike, the dilemma is at its sharpest.
Mechanisms of escalation. The dilemma can produce arms competitions, spirals of mutual suspicion and crises in which each side reads the other's precautions as hostile. Measures that signal restraint, such as transparency, defensive force postures and verification arrangements, are the traditional remedies.
Applying it today. The concept helps explain why rising military expenditure in one state often prompts responses elsewhere, and why conflicts between states can escalate without either side seeking a wider war. It offers a lens on the growth in interstate conflict discussed in MER/26/B01, Fewer Peacekeepers, More Wars Between States.
References
- Herz, J. H. (1950) "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", World Politics, 2(2), 157–180. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009187
- Jervis, R. (1978) "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", World Politics, 30(2), 167–214. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958